

16 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Data Processing

ATTENTION : Executive Officer, ODP

VIA : Deputy Director for Processing, ODP

25X1A FROM : [REDACTED]
Chief, Configuration and Environmental
Management Branch, Engineering Division, ODP

SUBJECT : ODP Assistance with Another Government Agency

REFERENCE : Memorandum for the Record dated 22 May 1980
and 6 June 1980 from [REDACTED] DDO, 25X1A
Subject: Discussions with NSA Personnel
Concerning Reciprocal Backup Agreement for
Emergency Computer Facilities

1. PURPOSE

25X1A This memorandum is to obtain approval of the Deputy Director
for Processing and the Director of Data Processing to follow up
on the feasibility of a contingency backup with NSA. The request
is a continuation of efforts started by [REDACTED] DDO, and 25X1A
[REDACTED], NSA, on arranging a reciprocal agreement to
provide a limited backup of each other's computer facilities.

2. DESCRIPTION OF ASSISTANCE

The attached memoranda summarize the meetings to date with
CIA and NSA personnel. NSA backup requirements to be met by ODP
appear minimal and could be provided with limited impact to normal
ODP services. DDO backup requirements are much greater because
of the large amount of online storage needed, however, NSA appears
to have developed plans to meet DDO's needs. ODP management
approval to proceed does not commit ODP or the Agency to a backup
agreement. Upon completion of further deliberations if the results
determine a backup contingency can be met, a formal Letter of
Agreement will be submitted to ODP management and coordinated with
O/DDA and OGC. In addition, ODP management approval does not
commit NSA as the only backup source for the DDO applications.
Additional sources will be explored and evaluated. ODP personnel
are in the process of working out the details for DDO backup
capabilities in the Ruffing Center.

SUBJECT: ODP Assistance with Another Government Agency

3. LOCATION OF ASSISTANCE

The type of backup service requested by NSA will be provided in the Ruffing Center. DDO initial backup will be provided in the Ruffing Center with alternative sources to be studied.

4. COMPONENT INVOLVED

Engineering, Operations and System Programming Divisions of Processing will be the primary ODP components involved. Support would also be required of OS/ISSG and the ODP Administrative Staff.

5. BASIS FOR ACTIVITY

The need for backup to critical DDO databases in the event of a disaster to the Special Center and interagency cooperation is the basis for the ODP involvement in this activity.

6. FINANCIAL COST

Until final agreement is reached, cost of the project is hard to estimate. However, no new equipment is required and most equipment to be used will be idle equipment. This is assuming the support will be provided during non-prime shifts.

7. MANPOWER

Some manpower to coordinate the implementation of the activity will be required as well as Security Escorts. Total ODP manpower to initiate the activity should be less than four man months.

8. PERSON TO CONTACT FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

25X1A [REDACTED] should be contacted for any additional information.

[REDACTED] 25X1A

SUBJECT: ODP Assistance with Another Government Agency

APPROVAL:

25X1A

[REDACTED]

Deputy Director for Processing, ODP

24 Jul 80
DATE

25X1A

[REDACTED]

Director of Data Processing

7/29/80
DATE

SG/ADB-80/66
22 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

25X1A FROM:

[REDACTED]
Software Specialist, SG/ADB

SUBJECT:

Discussions With NSA Personnel Concerning
Reciprocal Backup Agreement for
Emergency Computer Facilities (C)

1. This memorandum documents a meeting held at NSA on 12 May to explore the feasibility of arranging a reciprocal agreement to backup certain of each other's computer facilities. Attending

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2. It became readily apparent that both organizations agree in principle to the notion of developing a plan to backup a selected subset of each other's computer facilities, within the guidelines outlined below.

- The type of disaster/emergency envisioned is not one in which the entire building is destroyed, as in a nuclear attack, but rather where the computer facility is temporarily (a couple of weeks) disabled due to sabotage or accident, etc.

- If an application is moved to the backup facility it would operate in a degraded mode using only that equipment absolutely necessary to provide the minimum services required in a short-lived emergency situation.

- The only applications under consideration in this agreement are CIA's name trace and NSA's payroll programs. Arrangements for additional applications can be pursued later, if desired. (C)

3. The ensuing discussion revealed that NSA is willing to provide its System 90A, a 370/168 with attached processor as a backup system for CIA, and that CIA is willing to provide its Blue System, a 370/158 with attached processor as a backup system

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ORIGINAL CL BY [REDACTED]

DECLASS REVIEW ON 22 May 86

EXT BYND 6 YRS BY

REASON

for NSA. This arrangement will provide each party with the requisite software, mainframe, and terminal configuration to meet its backup needs. Disk storage space, however, was revealed to be a problem. CIA personnel identified a requirement for twenty-four 3350 and eight 3330 mod 11 disk drives, or the equivalent to run its name trace program. NSA does not have this much disk space readily available, but agreed to try to find some way to make it available on a short term, emergency basis. NSA identified a need for about eight 3350 and eight 3330 mod 11's. CIA representatives indicated they could probably support this requirement, but would need to coordinate it with CIA management and user personnel. (C)

4. Assuming the necessary disk space can be freed up, NSA representatives indicated they could make their System 90A available on a continuous basis for the entire two week period envisioned for backup use. Accordingly, we could build our initial system environment using backup tapes stored outside Headquarters (a process which could take up to 24 hours), then sustain that environment for the duration of the emergency on the NSA system, never having to incur the penalty of a long system initiation again. (C)

5. NSA representatives indicated they had not yet developed an emergency concept of operations for this particular contingency, but that they might need the CIA backup system for as little as one 24-36 hour period each two weeks. (C)

6. Both the NSA and CIA representatives agreed that further study of the subject is merited at this time. Although it is obvious that both parties support the concept of a reciprocal backup agreement, the feasibility of its implementation is still somewhat in doubt. The primary problem is one of disk-space availability at NSA. A secondary problem concerns providing an operating system to match both the NSA hardware and the CIA software (or the CIA hardware and the NSA software). All agreed to study these problems independently and reconvene the group in about three weeks to pursue the subject further. (C)

7. Accordingly, a second meeting was scheduled to be held at CIA Headquarters at 1000 on 3 June. (U)



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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt